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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the election of Mr. Brian Mulroney as the prime minister of
Canada in 1984,1 both Canada and the United States have expressed
interest in concluding a free trade agreement. While a sectoral free
trade arrangement was the initial focus, 2 the aim now is to develop
a comprehensive free trade agreement consistent with the provisions
of article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 3
Mr. Mulroney became prime minister following the September 1984 Canadian
elections in which his Progressive Conservative party gained 211 of the 282 seats in
the Canadian Parliament. The Progressive Conservative party defeated the Liberal
party which had ruled Canada for all but nine months since 1968. Kelly, Canada
Changes Course, TIME, Sept. 17, 1984, at 36.
2 See DEP'T EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (CAN.), Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980s:
A Discussion Paper (1983). See generally The Legal Aspects of Sectoral Integration
Between the United States and Canada, 10 CAN. - U.S. L.J. 1-257 (1985) (where
the entire issue consists of conference proceedings on sectoral free trade).
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The term GATT refers both to
the original agreement and to the institutional framework created by that instrument.
That framework has provided the structure for subsequent rounds of negotiations
aimed at eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The text of the GATT instrument
is reprinted in 3 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1958) [hereinafter BAsIC INSTRUMENTS]. Article XXIV
of the GATT states:
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom
of trade by the development, through voluntary arrangements, of closer
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agree-
ments. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a
free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories
and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such
territories.
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as
between territories of contracting parties the formation of . . . a free trade
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Article XXIV provides that countries may conclude regional free
trade arrangements without violating the most-favored nation re-
quirements contained in Article I of the GATT. 4 Article XXIV defines
a free trade area as "a group of two or more customs territories in
which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ...
are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories in products originating in such territories." 5 Since duties,
or tariffs, were the major barrier facing international trade at the
time the GATT was drafted in 1947,6 it is not surprising that they
are specifically mentioned in the definition. Due to the great success
of the GATT and subsequent negotiations conducted under its frame-
work, however, tariffs are no longer a significant barrier to trade.7
Nowhere is this liberalization more evident than in trade between
the United States and Canada. By 1987, when the two countries have
fully implemented their commitments made in the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations, ninety-five percent of Canadian exports to the
United States and eighty-five percent of United States exports to
Canada will pass duty free or with duties of less than five percent
As the United States Senate noted in 1979, however, "[a]s average
tariff rates . . . became progressively lower, the effects on trade of
area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation
of... a free trade area ....
Id. at 47-48. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 575-
624 (1969) (providing an overview of regional trading arrangements and their com-
patibility with the GATT). See also K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 274-95 (1970).
4 Article I provides that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted
by any contracting party to . . . any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to ... all other contracting parties." BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra
note 3, 4. See generally JACKSON, supra note 3 at 249-79 (discussing the most-favored
nation clause).
I BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 3 at 49 (art. XXIV(8)(6)).
6 See generally C. WiLCoX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1972) (for a detailed
account of the negotiations which resulted in the original GATT instrument and the
background against which those negotiations took place).
I Seven major rounds of trade negotiations have taken place under the GATT
framework (including the negotiations for the original GATT). The first six rounds
concentrated primarily on tariff reduction, although the Kennedy Round from 1962-
67 attempted to deal with non-tariff barriers as well. The seventh round, or Tokyo
Round, dealt primarily with the problem of non-tariff barriers. This emphasis was
due to the significant reduction in tariffs as barriers resulting from the previous six
rounds. J. JACKSON, J. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND
11-12 (1984).
1 3 STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (CAN.), CANADA - UNITED
STATES RELATIONS: CANADA'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 26 (1982)
[hereinafter CANADA - U.S. RELATIONS].
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national laws and policies other than tariffs, 'non-tariff barriers'
(NTBs), became more apparent." 9 Non-tariff barriers come in a
variety of forms. They may be as understandable as import quotas
or they may be as vague as technical standards and government
procurement policies. 10 All non-tariff barriers, however, exert a re-
straining effect on efforts to liberalize international trade. Although
these measures may not be designed to be protectionist devices, for
there may be legitimate and beneficial reasons for their existence,
they should be examined to determine if the benefit derived from
them is worth the cost.
The purpose of this paper is to look at three of the major statutory
import relief measures available to United States manufacturers -
safeguard, countervail, and antidumping - in the context of a Can-
ada-United States free trade agreement. Each of these measures will
be examined to determine whether they are consistent with the goals
of such an agreement. Where there is a conflict, a modification of
the existing legislation will be suggested.
As used in this paper, the concept of a free trade agreement is
the creation of a single economic market between the two separate,
though interdependent, markets of Canada and the United States.
The extent of this interdependence is illustrated by the fact that the
United States and Canada are each other's largest trading partners.
Three-quarters of Canada's total foreign trade is done with the United
States, while the province of Ontario alone imports more United
States goods than any other country in the world.' The statistic
presenting possible problems, however, is that Canada has a popu-
lation of 25 million compared to 240 million for the United States. 12
This difference in size will lead to disproportionate effects both in
terms of the negotiation and operation of the free trade agreement.
II. SAFEGUARD ACTIONS
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides that United States
industries seriously injured by imports may obtain temporary relief
9 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 381, 387.
10 See generally L. GLICK, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: WORLD TRADE
AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND (1984) (for a discussion of some of the major non-tariff
barriers and the effect of the Tokyo Round on those barriers).
Namerica, Namerica, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1985, at 15.
2 MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA, REPORT: ROYAL COMMISSION ON
THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR CANADA 300 (1985) [here-
inafter MINISTER'S REPORT].
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from all imports of a particular product. 3 The relief granted, which
may be in the form of quotas, supplementary duties, or tariff-rate
quotas, 14 must be nondiscriminatory in its application to different
countries. 5 The period for which relief is given may not exceed five
years, although that initial period may be extended for an additional
three years. 16
To obtain relief under section 201, the International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) must determine that a United States industry has
suffered or is threatened with serious injury substantially caused by
increased imports. '7 If this injury test is met, the ITC recommends
the type of relief the President should grant.' 8 The President, who
has sixty days in which to make his decision, has absolute discretion
in determining whether or not to grant relief and the form the relief
may take. 9
In its report on the Trade Act of 1974, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee stated:
The rationale for the "escape clause" has been and remains, that
as barriers to international trade are lowered, some industries and
workers inevitably face serious injury, dislocation and perhaps eco-
nomic extinction. The "escape clause" is aimed at providing tem-
porary relief for an industry suffering from serious injury, or the
threat thereof, so that the industry will have sufficient time to adjust
to the freer international competition. 20
The phrase "escape clause" is used as a synonym for the word
"safeguard." An escape clause in the strict sense relates only to relief
'3 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011 (1974)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982)).
"4 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1982).
1S Safeguard relief is authorized by Article XIX of the GATT, which contemplates
that the relief granted will be applied on a most-favored nation basis consistent with
Article I. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 564. Article I provides for most-favored nation
treatment "[wlith respect to custom duties and changes of any kind . . . and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation."
BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 3, at 4 (art. 1(1)).
-6 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(1), (3) (1982).
I Id. § 2251(b)(1).
,8 Id. § 2251(d)(l)(A).
,9 Id. § 2252(b). The statutory language states that "[wjithin 60 days . . . after
receiving a report from the Commission containing an affirmative finding . . . the
President shall . .. determine what method and amount of import relief he will
provide, or determine that the provision of such relief is not in the national economic
interest of the United States .... Id.
20 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7186, 7263.
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which permits a country to temporarily "escape" from trade conces-
sions previously granted. 2' This relationship between injury and
concessions, however, is not present in section 201. In fact, the Trade
Act of 1974 eliminated a former requirement that the increased im-
ports complained of result "in major part" from trade concessions. 22
Section 201, therefore, is not an escape clause. Instead, it is a
statutorily-imposed measure for determining what is an unacceptable
level of imports. Although discretionary, it nonetheless permits the
nullification of a concession without any evidence that the alleged
injurious imports can be attributed to that concession. In essence,
this result amounts to a "reversion to protectionism under the guise
of an 'escape' from a concession. '23
If one of "[tihe main purpose[s] of a free-trade agreement's guar-
antee of market access .. . [is] to create positive incentives for the
parties to undertake industrial restructuring . . . the continued avail-
ability of safeguard protection to firms injured by imports would
substantially undermine the economic goal of the signatories. " 24 Under
a free trade agreement, companies now producing a broad range of
products for a limited market would move to concentrate their re-
sources on a limited number of products designed to compete in the
expanded market. The goal is for each manufacturer to concentrate
in those areas where it has a comparative advantage, realizing the
lower costs created by the expanded economies of sale. The continued
availability of safeguard protection would, therefore, have an inhib-
iting effect by creating the possibility that a manufacturer, after
rationalizing its production, could be precluded from effectively com-
peting in the expanded market.
A possible solution to this problem is found in the safeguard
provisions of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations-
Trade Agreement (Australia-New Zealand Trade Agreement) con-
2 See generally JACKSON, supra note 3, at 553-73 (concerning United States escape
clause development and its impact on article XIX of the GATT).
22 Section 301 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provided for escape clause
relief when "as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements,
an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as
to cause, or threaten to cause, material injury to a domestic industry." Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301(b)(1), 76 Stat. 872, 884 (1962)
(emphasis added) (current veision at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (1982)).
23 Metzger, The Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance: Proposal and As-
sessments, 2 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 352, 366 (1970).
24 MINISTER'S REPORT, supra note 12, at 315.
.1987]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
cluded in 1983.25 The objectives of that agreement include the de-
velopment of closer economic relations through the expansion of free
trade between the two countries and a gradual and progressive elim-
ination of barriers to trade. 26
Article 17 of the Australia-New Zealand Trade Agreement deals
with the application of safeguard measures between the two coun-
tries. 27 It provides that safeguard action is available only when no
other solution can be found and only during the transition period. 28
The transition period is defined as the time when tariffs, quantitative
import restrictions, tariff quotas, performance-based export incen-
tives, and measures for stabilization or support imposed by the agree-
ment remain in force.29
To activate the safeguard mechanism, a party must make a written
request for consultations when, in its opinion, "goods originating in
the territory of the other Member State . . . are being imported in
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause, or
to pose an imminent and demonstrable threat to cause, severe material
injury to a domestic industry producing like goods." 30 Additionally,
those increased imports must result from measures taken pursuant
to the agreement or other government measures affecting trade in
the two-country area.3
Safeguard measures may be applied if there has been an opportunity
for consultation and the countries have not reached a mutually ac-
ceptable solution after ninety days.3 2 These measures may be applied
provided that:
(a) They shall be the minimum necessary to allow the fullest
possible opportunity for trade to continue consistent with amelio-
ration of the problem; and
(b) if involving quantitative import restrictions or tariff quotas
they shall be applied only in the most extreme circumstances and
where other safeguard measures would prove insufficient amelio-
ration of the problem and shall not be regarded as a means of
23 Australia - New Zealand Closer Economic Relations - Trade Agreement, re-
printed in 22 I.L.M. 946 (1983) [hereinafter Australia - New Zealand Agreement].
26 Id. at 948-49 (art. 1).
27 Id. at 967 (art. 17).
28 Id.
29 Id. (art. 17(l)(b)).
30 Id. (art. 17(2)).
3, Id. at 967-68 (art. 17(2)(b)).
32 Id. at 968 (art. 17(5)).
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extending the date for the elimination of quantitative import re-
strictions or tariff quotas . . ..
When safeguard measures are imposed, they are limited to a two-
year time period.14 At the end of this period, tariff levels, tariff
quotas, and import restrictions revert to the levels at which they
existed immediately prior to the implementation of relief, and lib-
eralization of trade pursuant to the agreement continues.35 Finally,
"[i]n the event of severe material injury or demonstrable threat thereof
arising from the operation of [the agreement] . . . occurring after
the transition period," the parties must consult under the general
consultation and review mechanisms of the agreement to determine
whether remedial action is appropriate.3 6
The phased elimination of safeguard actions found in the Australia-
New Zealand Trade Agreement can serve as a model for the Canada-
United States free trade agreement. For those areas in which free
trade already exists, the availability of a safeguard action should be
eliminated. Safeguard protection, however, should be available in
those areas where tariffs and other barriers exist. As these barriers
are eliminated over the transition period of the agreement, safeguard
protection also should be eliminated. Additionally, as in the Australia-
New Zealand Trade Agreement,3 7 a true escape clause should be
included in the agreement.
The reason for retaining an escape clause and delaying the complete
elimination of safeguard measures lies with the adjustment costs of
trade liberalization. Under traditional economic theory those domestic
resources idled by import competition will move to other products
that have a better competitive position.38 This theory assumes a static
model with perfect mobility of capital and labor.3 9 Experience has
shown, however, that there is no perfect mobility. The result, instead,
is short-term costs of liberalized trade which take the form of un-
employment, increased welfare payments, under-utilized resources,
relocation expenses, and intangible individual burdens. °
31 Id. (art. 17(6)).
14 Id. at 969 (art. 17(7)(a)).
35 Id. (art. 17(7)(b), (c)).
36 Id. (art. 17(11)).
31 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
38 See generally JACKSON, supra note 3, at 567-73 (detailing the concept of market
disruption and the policy of escape clauses).
39 H. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND PAYMENTS 171 (1979).
4- Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo
Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 259 (1980).
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Additionally, the benefits derived from freer trade may accrue over
a long period of time, or be spread out over a large number of
consumers who may not be as well-organized as those business firms
and labor organizations negatively affected by increased trade. 4' The
cost of adjustment thus becomes both an economic matter and a
political one. This adjustment cost necessitates the consideration of
"not only economic costs and benefits over a period of time, but
also the short-term balance of costs and benefits and how those relate
to the political forces which play a role in international trade. 42
The continued availability of safeguard actions up until the time
when the barriers are eliminated, as well as the presence of an escape
clause, provide the necessary cushion to absorb many of these costs.
An escape clause is necessary because the adjustment time required
to restructure may exceed that provided for under the agreement.
The length of the adjustment time will vary from industry to industry,
as restructuring takes the form of investment for increased efficiency
or a gradual shifting of resources into other areas of production. 43
In those instances where safeguard or escape clause relief is granted
under the agreement, that relief should be conditioned upon adjust-
ment measures actually taking place. Precedent for this position is
found in the Steel Import Stabilization Act, part of the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984." Under the Steel Import Stabilization Act, the
United States steel industry is granted broad relief from import com-
petition for a five-year period.45 This relief, however, is contingent
upon an annual affirmative determination by the President that the
steel industry has taken measures designed to improve its efficiency
and competitiveness. 46 These measures include the commitment of:
(i) substantially all of their net cash flow from steel product
operations for purposes of reinvestment in, and modernization of,
that industry through investment in modern plant and equipment,
research and development, and other appropriate projects, such as
working capital for steel operations and programs for the retraining
of workers; and
(ii) sufficient action to maintain their international competitive-
ness, including action to produce price-competitive and quality-
41 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 568.
42 Id.
41 Barcelo, supra note 40, at 259.
" Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
Id. § 801, 98 Stat. 3043.
4 See id. § 806(b), 98 Stat. 3046.
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competitive products, to control costs of production, including em-
ployment costs, and to improve productivity . . .47
In sharp contrast to these provisions are the actions of General
Motors (GM) during the four years in which the Voluntary Restraint
Agreement (VRA) was imposed on Japanese automakers. The purpose
of the VRA, which the ITC estimated to have cost consumers $15.7
billion in higher prices,48 was to give United States automakers with
low productivity time to become competitive. 49 GM, however, made
the following decisions during those four years: it abandoned plans
to produce its small S-car in the United States; it made equity in-
vestments in Isuzu, Suzuki, and Daewoo as elements of an agreement
wherein those firms would supply vehicles to GM; and, it established
a joint venture with Toyota. 0 Additionally, GM purchased Hughes
Aircraft Co. and Electronic Data Systems for more than $7.5 billion.'
Thus, the excess profits extracted during the period of the VRA went
not to increasing the competiveness of the domestic industry, but to
diversifying out of the auto industry and to more closely aligning
the domestic industry with its foreign competitors.
As previously noted, 52 the granting of relief under section 201 must
be nondiscriminatory in its application to different countries. This
raises the possibility that relief granted to a domestic industry com-
plaining about imports from countries other than Canada also would
restrict Canadian exports of that product. Although the GATT re-
quires the application of safeguard measures on a most-favored nation
basis, exempting Canada from that rule would likely be consistent
with the GATT article XXIV requirement that free trade areas elim-
inate substantially all "restrictive regulations of commerce." 53
III. COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
The United States can impose countervailing duties on imported
merchandise subsidized by foreign governments or other foreign ent-
'7 Id. § 806(b)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 3046.
4s Pine, Quotas on Autos From Japan Said to Lift Prices, Wall St. J., Feb. 14,
1985, at 3, col. 2. The ITC study estimated that the restraints raised prices on
United States-made autos an average of $78 a car in 1981, $170 in 1982, $426 in
1983, and $659 in 1984. For Japanese-made cars sold in the United States, the
respective figures are $185, $359, $831, and $1300. Id.
49 Schnapp, When a U.S. Industry Got a Chance to 'Catch Up', Wall St. J.,
Sept. 25, 1985, at 30, col. 4.
50 Id.
Brody, Can GM Manage It All?, FORTUNE, July 8, 1985, at 22.
52 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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ities.54 The duty is equal to the amount of "net subsidy" as determined
by a Commerce Department investigation.55 For some countries, in-
cluding Canada, there is also an injury requirement. 6 The ITC must
find that the subsidized imports have caused some actual or threatened
"material injury" to a competing domestic industry. 7 The statute
defines material injury as "harm which is not inconsequential, im-
material or unimportant.""8
Subsidies may be divided into two different types: export subsidies
and domestic subsidies.5 9 An export subsidy is a subsidy conditioned
54 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671 (1982). The term "subsidy" includes, but is not
limited to the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (relating
to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by gov-
ernment action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises
or industries, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or
bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export
of any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses
sustained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production,
or distribution.
Id. § 1677(5).
" Id. § 1671(a). The term "net subsidy" is defined as the gross subsidy minus
the amount of:
(A) Any application fee, deposit, or similar payment paid in order to
qualify for, or to receive, the benefit of the subsidy,
(B) any loss in the value of the subsidy resulting from its deferred receipt,
if the deferral is mandated by Government order, and
(C) export taxes, duties, or other charges levied on the export of mer-
chandise to the United States specifically intended to offset the subsidy
received.
Id. § 1677(6).
56 There are three categories of countries which have an injury requirement. The
first two categories are those countries which have signed the GATT Subsidies Code
or those which have signed agreements with the United States committing themselves
to obligations similar to those in the Subsidies Code. Id. § 1671(b). The third
category is the countries who are members of GATT and whose imports in question
would otherwise enter duty free. Id. § 1303(a)(2). There is no injury test for the
products of all other countries who do not qualify under any of the three categories.
Id. § 1303(b).
:7 Id. § 1671d(b)(l).
58 Id. § 1677(7)(A).
59 See generally DAM, supra note 3, 132-47 (discussing the two kinds of subsidies,
which he defines as production and export subsidies); see also JACKSON, supra note
3, 365-99 (discussing subsidies in the context of the GATT).
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on export of the product or on export performance. Domestic sub-
sidies, however, are benefits granted without regard to output des-
tination. Export subsidies are per se improper, 6° since they are
considered to be a direct attempt by the subsidizing government to
gain a greater share of foreign markets.
Before the Michelin Tire6' case in 1973, the United States had never
imposed a countervailing duty against a domestic subsidy. In Michelin
Tire, however, the Treasury Department found that certain payments
and benefits made to the Michelin Company to induce it to build a
plant in Nova Scotia constituted a countervailable subsidy. 62 Following
that decision, the Treasury began countervailing actions against other
domestic subsidies. 63
Congress codified this move toward imposing duties on domestic
subsidies in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 64 which contains the
present countervailing duty law. A key question is whether the benefit
is generally available to all businesses in the country or whether it
is conferred on a particular business or industry. 65 If the benefit has
been granted to a specific business or industry, a subsidy probably
will be found. Additionally, the benefit given is examined to determine
whether it is expected to produce the type of return that a private
investor would expect. 66 If it is not expected to produce such a return,
the Commerce Department may recognize it as a subsidy.
The problem with the present countervailing duty law under a free
trade agreement is as follows:
a vigorously applied U.S. countervail system could have an ine-
quitably heavier impact on the effectiveness of Canadian industrial
development policies when contrasted to any parallel countervail
action Canada could take against the United States. This is because
- See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982).
61 X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 1,018 (1973).
62 Id. See generally R. Guido & M. Morrone, The Michelin Decision: A Possible
New Direction for U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 237
(1974) (criticizing the decision in the Michelin case).
63 See, e.g., Certain Optic Liquid Level Sensing Systems From Canada, 44 Fed.
Reg. 1,728 (1979) (research and development grant); Certain Fish From Canada, 44
Fed. Reg. 1,372 (1979) (regional grants to fishing industry).
64 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 1979 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (93 Stat.) 144 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
65 Id. § 771(5)(B), 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (93 Stat.) 177 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982)).
- Id. § 771(5)(B)(i), 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (93 Stat.) 177
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i) (1982)).
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such a relatively large percentage of Canadian production is exported
while in the United States the major portion of production is for
the internal market. Any subsidization of Canadian industry could
be seen as involving an encouragement of production for export
purposes and would accordingly run the risk of U.S. countervail.
By contrast, subsidization of a firm in the United States would be
directed mainly toward encouraging production for the U.S. domestic
market and would only involve the risk of a Canadian countervail
for the very small percent of products which it might export. 67
As noted in the introduction, a free trade area will result in the
creation of a single economic market of 265 million people out of
the two existing markets of Canada and the United States. 68 Assume
a hypothetical example wherein a United States firm is given a subsidy
by a federal or state agency and a Canadian firm is given a similar
subsidy by a federal or provincial agency. Both firms produce a
product which is marketable to all 265 million people. Because of
population differences, application of each of the countries' respective
countervailing duty laws would result in the potential imposition of
duties on ninety percent of the Canadian firm's potential output while
the United States firm would face a countervailing duty on only ten
percent of its potential output. Thus, although each firm received a
similar subsidy, the impact on the Canadian firm would be more
severe.
A possible solution to this problem would come from the intro-
duction of the equitable doctrine of "clean hands. ' 69 Under this
doctrine a United States firm would be unable to file a countervailing
duty petition against a benefit received by a Canadian firm if the
United States firm received a similar benefit. This modification does
not contemplate the elimination of the countervailing duty law, for
there may be instances where it should be applied to remedy unfairly
subsidized competition. The modification is designed, however, to
soften the mechanical method now used to determine which subsidies
are countervailable.
Along with the introduction of the "clean hands" doctrine, the
President needs discretionary authority to determine whether or not
6' CANADA - U.S. RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 12.
61 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
69 "The equitable principle which requires a denial of relief to a complaintant
who is himself guilty of inequitable conduct in reference to the matter in controversy."
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 208 (3d ed. 1969). See generally 27 AM. JUR. 2D
Equity §§ 136-44 (1966) (discussing the "clean hands" doctrine).
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to impose countervailing duties. Under the present law relief must
be given if the necessary statutory findings are made. 70 The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals recognized the need for such discre-
tionary authority in United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc."1
The court noted the need for "executive discretion to avoid making
the United States [look] ridiculous by penalizing imports from foreign
countries which have taken reasonable action, action which our own
government takes or counsels." ' 72 The court further stated that
"[c]ountervailing duties are strong medicine, well calculated to arouse
violent resentment in countries whose trade practices are branded...
as unethical." ' 73 Thus, there is a need for discretionary authority to
make political decisions; "not necessarily partisan political, but po-
litical in a broad sense, legislative or of a policy nature. ' 74 Such
discretionary authority, by focusing its effect, would make the coun-
tervailing duty a more effective instrument.
The Canadian economy is much more likely to face the greatest
adjustment costs under a free trade agreement. 75 Those costs will
encompass the rationalization of product lines and restructuring as
industries seek to adjust to the expanded market and the increased
competition. This adjustment may require the assistance of the Ca-
nadian Government in the form of government-backed loans, research
and development grants, accelerated depreciation, or other such meas-
ures. 
7 6
Under the existing countervailing duty law, most of these assistance
measures would be countervailable. An exemption may be found,
however, in the GATT Subsidies Code, 77 to which the United States
70 The statute reads "there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a counter-
vailing duty." 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982) (emphasis added). Contrast this with the
discretionary authority given the President under the safeguard legislation. See supra
note 19 and accompanying text.
", United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc. 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
72 Id. at 1031.
73 Id.
74 Id.
71 An "assessment of the economic costs of free trade indicates that Canadian
investors and employees are likely to bear relatively larger adjustment burdens than
their U.S. counterparts." MINISTER'S REPORT, supra note 12, at 316.
76 Id. at 317.
7' The Agreement on Interpretation and Application Of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade done at Geneva Apr. 12,
1979, 31 U.S.T.S. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted in GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 56 (Supp. 26
1987]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
and Canada are signatories. Article 11 of the Code recognizes that
subsidies, other than export subsidies, may be an important instrument
in promoting social and economic policy objectives. 7 Among the
subsidies listed as acceptable by that article are those designed "to
facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable conditions, of
certain sectors, especially where this has become necessary by reason
of changes in trade and economic policies, including international
agreements resulting in lower barriers to trade. '79
Although article 11 appears to address clearly the acceptability of
certain subsidies designed to "restructure" an industry, the recent
British Steel ° decision raises new questions. In that case the Court
of International Trade found the infusion of equity into the British
Steel Corporation (BSC) in the form of loans, capital, and forgiveness
of debt, to be countervailable even though some of the funds spe-
cifically provided for the closure of redundant facilities and the lay-
off of unnecessary workers."' The court held that such actions con-
stituted funding on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations
and thus constituted subsidies under the statute.8 2
In responding to BSC's contention that its actions were a method
of restructuring consistent with the Subsidies Code, the court quoted
from the subsidy determination findings made by the International
Trade Administration:
1980) [hereinafter SUasIDIES CODE]. The Agreement's main features include the
following:
the coverage of both industrial and primary (e.g., agricultural) products in
an agreement designed to insure that the use of subsidies does not adversely
affect or prejudice the interests of any signatory to the agreement and that
the imposition of countervailing duties do not unjustifiably impede inter-
national trade. The agreement establishes an international framework of
rights and obligations in using subsidies and in invoking countervailing
measures against them and imposes a system of surveillance and dispute
settlement to hold each country accountable for its activities.
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS II - SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 37 (1980).
78 SUasIDms CODE, supra note 77, art. 11, at 532, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.
19 Id. art. ll(l)(b), at 533, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.
1o British Steel Corp. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 286 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985),
aff'd in relevant part on remand, 632 F.Supp. 59 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (affirming
the equity infusion decision).
1, The court stated that "[t]he apparent purpose of ... closing obsolete facilities,
eliminating excess capacity and laying off unnecessary workers, is to reduce costs
and enhance the competitiveness of the remaining enterprise." Id. at 293.
82 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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We disagree with BSC's interpretation of the countervailing duty
law and the Code. Our statutory obligations are carefully defined
and mandatory in nature. Whenever it is determined that subsidized
imports are injuring the domestic industry that manufactures or
produces a like product, we are required by domestic law, and
authorized by the Code, to impose appropriate countervailing duties,
provided, of course that all relevant procedural requirements are
satisfied .13
Therefore, even though actions taken by the Canadian Government
might be consistent with article 11 of the Subsidies Code, they still
would be subject to countervailing duties under the existing law. This
dichotomy points out the need, once again, for increased discretionary
authority in the imposition of countervailing duties. Such discretionary
authority would allow the executive branch to exempt from countervail
those "subsidies" which are employed by the Canadian Government
to facilitate adjustment under the free trade agreement.
Finally, both the countervailing duty and antidumping laws need
to be modified in order to allow Canadian manufacturers to bring
an action against third-country importers.84 Since there may be certain
areas in which Canadian producers would face no competition in the
combined market, it is necessary to protect them from unfair actions
of third-country exporters. Such an action is not presently available
under United States law because there is no harm of which to complain
if there are no United States competitors. The availability of an action
by Canadian competitors to protect their rights in that market is
consistent with the notion of a unified market created by the free
trade agreement.
'3 British Steel, 605 F. Supp. at 292 (emphasis in original). The court further
stated that "the countervailing duty law concerns itself not with the government's
purpose or intent in a particular program, but whether the government's funds give
the country's exports an unfair competitive advantage." Id. at 294.
14 See, e.g., Australia-New Zealand Agreement, supra note 25, at 967 (art. 16(8)).
That section provides:
If a Member State (hereinafter in this paragraph called "the first Member
State") is of the opinion that goods imported into the territory of the other
Member State from outside the Area are being subsidized by a third country
and that this subsidization is causing or is threatening to cause material
injury to an industry located in the territory of the first Member State the
other Member State shall, at the written request of the first Member State,
examine the possibility of taking action, consistent with its international
obligations, to prevent material injury.
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IV. ANTIDUMPING
The antidumping statutes provide that a duty is to be imposed on
an import if its market price in the United States is less than the
price charged by the producer in its home market. 5 Additionally,
the statutes require that a domestic industry be materially injured or
threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an
industry in the United States be materially retarded by reason of the
sale of the import. 86 Material injury is defined in the same manner
as under the countervailing duty laws: "harm which is not incon-
sequential, immaterial, or unimportant. ' 87 The purpose of the statute
is to protect United States producers and, ostensibly, consumers from
the negative effects of unfairly-priced imports.88
Several reasons exist for dumping: (1) To prevent the creation of
a competitive domestic industry; (2) to eliminate competition in an
export market; (3) to reduce excess inventories without disrupting
domestic pricing policies; and (4) to utilize excess production ca-
pacity. 9 The first two reasons are clearly predatory because their
purpose is to destroy competition in the importing market. The long-
term goal of these actions is to be able to cease dumping at some
future time and then to charge higher prices containing an element
of monopoly rent.9 The second two reasons by themselves are not
predatory. Instead, they may be a rational and competitive response
designed to maximize profitability or minimize loss.
It must be possible to separate the two national markets for dump-
ing to technically occur.9' The reason for this is relatively straight-
85 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a)-(i) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Antidumping remedies also
are authorized under article VI of the GATT and by the separately adopted GATT
Antidumping Code. Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade done at Geneva, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T, 4919, T.I.A.S. 9650,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 309 (1979).
19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982).
Id. § 1677(7)(A).
See generally J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1966)
(presenting the initial standard reference on dumping and its distorting effects on
international trade).
89 GRAY, supra note 39, 170.
go Id.
9, Barcelo, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, 1 MICH. Y.B. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 53, 59 (1979). Dumping also requires that the dumper have the power
to affect the price in its home market by increasing or decreasing supply. If it could
not so affect the price, the dumper would be able to sell its entire output in its
home market without the excess supply, now dumped, exerting a downward pressure
on the price. Id. at 59-60.
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forward. If barriers did not exist between the two national markets,
anyone could undercut the dumper's higher home market price by
re-importing the lower-priced exported goods. 92 Additionally, without
barriers the dumper would be unable to subsidize the losses incurred
in its predatory conduct by charging higher prices in its domestic
market. Those manufacturers hurt by such predatory conduct could
begin selling their products in the dumper's home market, thereby
eliminating the dumper's ability to absorb the short-term dumping
losses.
A free trade agreement between Canada and the United States
would eliminate many of the barriers presently affecting trade between
the two countries. 93 Eliminating the barriers would result in a cor-
responding reduction in the possible occurrence of dumping. Even if
dumping technically could occur under the agreement, the retention
of the existing antidumping law is flatly inconsistent with the economic
goals of such an agreement.
The economic effect of a free trade agreement would be to increase
competition, which would hopefully result in lower prices and greater
efficiency. Therefore, the focus of economic regulation should be to
encourage and facilitate that competition. The focus of the anti-
dumping law, however, is not on the protection of competition but
on the protection of competitors. 94 As one commentator noted:
At the root of [the antidumping law] . . . is the notion that U.S.
producers... are entitled to government-imposed protection against
foreign "unfair" competition .... [However,] the traditional con-
cept of price discrimination which is at the heart of the antidumping
law, focuses entirely on a difference in prices charged by the in-
dividual foreign producer in his domestic and foreign markets; the
92 Id. at 60.
91 Although a free trade agreement would eliminate many of the artificial barriers
to trade, natural barriers, such as transportation costs, would still exist. Thus, a
manufacturer could still dump without fear that the dumped products would be re-
imported.
94 As one author stated, contrasting the antidumping laws with the antitrust
statutes:
In both [antidumping and antitrust] ... Congress intended to eliminate
the use of price-cutting tactics that impair the competitive position of
domestic sellers. The Antidumping Act applies, however, without regard
for the competitive structure of the industry being affected by price dis-
crimination . . . . The Antidumping Act . . . has been administered without
regard to the anticompetitive impact of duties imposed on lower priced
imports at the behest of domestic monopolies, oligopolists, or cartels.
S. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARRIERS 63 (1974).
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element of predation is lacking .... Dumping does not exist merely
because the foreigner undersells all U.S. competitors; on the other
hand, dumping is not avoided because the foreigner is merely meeting
the price of the U.S. market. 95
In addition, the antidumping law fails to provide "basic defenses
that would be inherent in an antitrust regime, such as meeting com-
petition and an absence of effect on the competitive process (as
opposed to mere injury to the domestic producers)." 96 Thus, with
no showing of predatory intent required, even a relatively small import
penetration may result in the imposition of duties despite the absence
of any anticompetitive effect on United States industry and the fact
that the United States industry may be concentrated or inefficient. 97
The retention of the antidumping law in a free trade agreement
would inhibit increased price competition resulting from the agree-
ment. The abolition of the antidumping law, however, would not
leave the domestic producer defenseless in the face of predatory price
competition. The problem of predatory pricing can be handled under
existing legislation that contemplates private adjudication rather than
government intervention.
The reasons for moving to a private adjudicatory framework are
threefold.98 First, such a move would reduce possible inter-govern-
mental friction. Since dumping is essentially a business-to-business
problem, the dispute should be resolved without involving the re-
spective governments. Second, under a private adjudicatory proceed-
ing, a manufacturer is directly compensated for any proven violation.
This compensation may take the form of damages and/or injunctive
relief and, in contrast to antidumping duties, would accrue to the
manufacturer rather than to the government. Third, private adju-
dication would be more cost-effective. Those businesses alleging injury
would devote as many resources to the problem as they deem justified.
One piece of existing legislation which addresses the problem of
unfair price competition is the Robinson-Patman Act (Act).99 The
pertinent statutory language reads as follows:
9 Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the
Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361, 1362-63 (1979).
96 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
62-63 (2d ed. 1981).
97 Id. at 62.
" See Ehrenhaft, supra note 95, at 1393-95.
99 Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982)). See generally E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-
PATMAN PRIMER (1979) (providing a detailed discussion of this Act).
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It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . .1
Inasmuch as the Act defines "commerce" as including both in-
terstate and foreign commerce,' 0 it would appear that conduct now
dealt with under the antidumping law could be actionable under the
Act. In the only case to deal with this specific question, however,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's de-
termination that the two prices being compared under the Act must
be from sales within the United States. 0 2 In disallowing a claim based
on differing prices between the foreign manufacturers' domestic sales
and their sales in the United States, 03 the district court held that
"the requirement of 'use, consumption, or resale within the United
States' modifies and limits the more general 'in commerce' provision
upon which plaintiffs primarily rely.''l4
This Third Circuit decision, however, does not totally preclude a
Robinson-Patman action based on differing prices between the United
States and Canada. As the Supreme Court noted in Automatic Can-
teen Co. of America v. F.T.C.,1°5 "precision of expression is not an
outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act."106 Thus, one
could make a good faith argument for disregarding the decision of
the Third Circuit. Additionally, Congress could make a statutory
modification, or clarification, to delineate clearly the scope of the
Act. Finally, a provision of the free trade agreement could provide
for the application of the Act to all sales in the combined market.
Some have argued that a better alternative to the antidumping law
is the Sherman Act. 0 7 Section 2 of the Sherman Act'08 provides
0 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
101 See Id. § 12(a).
102 In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 316-17
(3rd Cir. 1983).
103 At issue was a claim by several United States manufacturers of electronic
products that their Japanese competitors were selling the same products in their
home markets at prices higher than what they were selling them in the United States.
See id.
10, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. 402 F. Supp.
244, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
,03 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. F.T.C., 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
106 Id. at 65.
07 See Barcelo, supra note 91, at 66-67.
,08 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
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protection against monopolization or attempts to monopolize "any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations."'09 The beneficial attributes of the Sherman Act are
that it applies to "all forms of predatory pricing, not just discrim-
inatory predation, and there . .. [is] no difficulty in obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction over a foreign supplier against whom a colorable
case could be made of seeking through predatory pricing to monop-
olize an American market."1 0
Finally, relief may be obtained under the Predatory Dumping Act
of 1916.111 The Act "forbids regular, continued price discrimination
between purchasers in different national markets whenever the dis-
crimination is motivated by a desire to destroy competition."' 1 2 This
Act, like the Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Act, provides
for the recovery of treble damages." 3 The Predatory Dumping Act,
however, has rarely been invoked due to its multiple proof require-
ments, including a showing of specific intent to destroy competition
in the United States.114 Given the more mechanical proof elements
required under the regular antidumping law, which lacks any mens
rea element, it is not surprising that the 1916 Act has been used so
rarely.'1
V. CONCLUSION
The trade laws of the United States should facilitate adjustment
in the continuing transition towards global trade interdependence.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
-- 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
110 Barcelo, supra note 91, at 67.
" Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 72 (1982)). See generally Hiscocks, International Price Discrimination: The Dis-
covery of the Predatory Dumping'Act of 1916, 11 INT'L LAW. 227 (1977) (detailing
the history and use of the Act).
.12 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982).
113 The statute provides that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property..
shall recover threefold the damages sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
114 The Act states that such predatory action shall be unlawful:
Provided, That such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying
or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the estab-
lishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monop-
olizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.
Id.
115 See Hiscocks, supra note 111, 228-34.
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They should not, therefore, impede the development and utility of
trade-liberalization measures such as free trade arrangements. The
modifications to the safeguard, countervail, and antidumping legis-
lation suggested in this paper would substantially eliminate their
availability vis-a-vis Canadian manufacturers. The modifications,
however, are predicated on the assumption that Canada would make
reciprocal modifications to its import relief laws. The effect would
be to create that "level playing field" which the United States has
espoused as its goal in the area of international trade. It would put
Canada and United States manufacturers on an equal competitive
footing as they adjust to the changes arising from the conclusion of
a free trade agreement. Given the relatively minor effect which tariffs
now have as barriers, the conclusion of a free trade agreement which
eliminated customs duties but left the present import relief measures
substantially intact would be a triumph of form over substance and
would prevent both Canada and the United States from realizing to
the fullest extent the benefits arising from free trade.
Roland J. Behm
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